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Alexis Tsipras, the new Greek prime minister, 
has announced that he intends to terminate 
the policy of austerity and that “subservience 
is over.” How will this affect policymaking in 
the euro-zone? Is the troika going to 
reconsider its positions? Will the other crisis-
ridden states join in the rebellion? And what 
has all this got to do with the European 
Central Bank and “quantitative easing?” 
Henrik Enderlein, who is Professor of Political 
Economy at the Hertie School of Governance 
and Director of Jacques Delors Institut – 
Berlin, provides some answers to these 
questions. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung: Most political 
observers and market participants were 
expecting Alexis Tsipras and his left-wing 
Syriza party to win the elections. Were you 
taken aback by the magnitude of their victory, 
and the fact that they were close to an 
absolute majority? 
 
Henrik Enderlein: It should be pointed out that 
the size of their victory is also due to the Greek 
electoral system, which gives the largest party 50 
bonus seats. To put it another way, Syriza 
obtained 36.5 percent of the votes, but this does 
not amount to an absolute majority of Greek 
voters. However, it is quite obviously a 
resounding victory for Tsipras, and many people 
were stunned by the fact that Syriza did not have 
to conduct serious negotiations about a coalition 
with another party. It needed only two votes in 
order to be certain of an absolute majority. Thus 
there can be no doubt about the fact that prime 
minister Tsipras is the new strong man and will 
himself be able to decide which path he wishes 
to pursue. So he should now put his cards on the 
table. 
In the wake of the crisis that has been in 
evidence since 2012, the election results can 
be construed as a vote against the policy of 
austerity. But Greece continues to be 
embroiled in negotiations with the troika in 
general, and the European Commission in 
particular. What do you think of the headline 
in SPIEGEL-ONLINE which said that the 
Greeks had booted Angela Merkel out of 
office? 
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I am completely against blowing up the situation 
out of all proportion in the wake of the elections 
and doing as if we were heading for a showdown 
between Tsipras and Merkel. That is not what is 
going to happen. I think that Tsipras will notice 
very quickly that he now has responsibility for a 
whole country. Of course he will go into new 
negotiations making tough demands. But initially 
the Europeans are also going to be intransigent, 
and will insist on adherence to contractual 
obligations. Subsequently – not tomorrow or the 
day after tomorrow, but over the course of the 
next few weeks or even months – the people 
involved will quietly try to elucidate if there is 
room for manoeuvre and some kind of 
compromise. Both sides will have to make 
concessions.  
It is clear that the Greek debt burden is currently 
a serious problem. A debt cut – and here we are 
not talking about a private debt cut, but about a 
debt cut by the public sector, that is, by the 
European governments – a debt cut of this kind 
would in fact create far more room for 
manoeuvre. There are many ways in which this 
could be implemented. For example, debt 
servicing could be tied to Greek growth rates. The 
level of interest payments and repayment of 
principal would be defined by the gross domestic 
product. I believe that this should have been done 
before the elections. Perhaps it would have been 
a way of showing support for Samaras and his 
government, which did a lot of hard work. 
But now – immediately after the elections – such 
a step would look a bit like a concession, and for 
this reason I am assuming that there will be a 
reduction of the debt burden in the medium term, 
though not in the near future. Before this happens 
Tsipras will have to promise not to terminate the 
structural reforms and not to dispense with the 
policy of austerity in its entirety. 
When all is said and done, in political terms we 
will probably have gridlock. In contrast to what the 
highly dramatic media reports predict, I think that 
we are unlikely to see a showdown any time 
soon, and that we will have to wait several weeks 
and perhaps even months before a new 
negotiating approach emerges.  
 
Immediately after the elections the Socialists 
& Democrats in the European Parliament said 
it was time to renegotiate Greek debt. You 
yourself have said that another round of debt 
relief is virtually unavoidable. Is it perhaps a 
wrong signal if what we want states to do is 
to implement even more structural reforms, 
and especially in the case of Portugal and 
Ireland? 
It is a difficult balancing act between recognizing 
a democratic electoral process on the one hand 
and a duty not to jettison agreements once they 
have been concluded on the other. Changed 
political majorities do not mean that Greece no 
longer has to honour its contractual obligations. 
The negotiations will be watched very closely in 
other countries. That is why I am certain that 
initially Tsipras is not going to be getting any 
concessions in the weeks ahead. The troika is 
surely not interested in strengthening the left-
wing and right-wing populist movements 
opposed to the euro-zone in Spain, Italy and 
France by reaching an agreement with Syriza too 
fast and too soon. 
This is especially important in the case of Spain. 
Thus the local Podemos movement tends to take 
its bearings from Syriza. The number of potential 
Podemos voters in Spain rises whenever Tsipras 
notches up a success. The elections in Spain at 
the end of the year may well create a difficult 
political situation, though in a far larger and, in 
systemic terms, a far more important member 
state. 
 
Was the European Central Bank (ECB) 
decision of what is known as “quantitative 
easing” that was taken on 22 January 2015 
also to the benefit of Greece, a programme 
country? 
No. The decision of the European Central Bank  
has nothing whatsoever to do with the elections 
or the political situation in Greece. With 
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“quantitative easing” the ECB is making one final 
attempt to deal with the threat of deflation in the 
euro-zone. The International Monetary fund 
(IMF) believes that there is a 40 percent 
probability of deflation. Thus the risk should not 
be underestimated. It is the reason why the ECB 
prepared for this move in a long and difficult 
political process. 
As a member state Greece is too small to play a 
role in this more fundamental area. That is why 
the ECB has introduced internal rules on bond 
purchases, and as a result no Greek debt can be 
purchased before the summer at the earliest. 
 
The Bundesbank does not think that there is 
a risk of deflation. Why did the ECB have to 
take action? 
If, as a medical doctor, you are confronted with a 
patient who in your opinion is significantly at risk 
and may well become dangerously ill, it is your 
duty to deal with the disease in a preventive 
manner. Even if the medicines have side effects. 
That is precisely what the European Central Bank 
is doing. As we have seen, the IMF thinks that 
there is a 40 percent chance of deflation. This 
means we are not sure that there is going to be 
deflation, but the possibility certainly cannot be 
excluded. I am baffled by the Bundesbank’s lack 
of concern and the fact that it considers the risk 
of deflation to be non-existent. To exclude a risk 
quite explicitly whilst others consider it to be 
significant is a dangerous and rather 
irresponsible strategy. 
And in contrast to the ECB’s OMT programme, 
which was restricted to selective purchases of 
government bonds from the crisis-ridden 
countries, the broadly-based purchases of the 
programme that has now been adopted have not 
been challenged for legal reasons. 
 
There has been a slump in the value of the 
euro. Is the ECB weakening the currency? 
The ECB would not put it that way, but bond 
purchases are having their intended effect, which 
is to drive the euro down. We should not forget, 
especially in Germany, that in times of low growth 
a weak exchange rate can also have a positive 
and indeed dynamic effect on the German 
economy. We are world export champions. Our 
goods are less expensive when there is a weaker 
euro, and this is injecting an extra dose of 
dynamism into the country. Once growth returns 
to the euro-zone – which is what we all hope will 
happen – and if this causes inflation to pick up, 
the ECB will terminate its bond purchasing 
programme very quickly. Immediately, in fact. 
And interest rates will go up and act as a brake 
on rising prices. The value of the euro will start to 
rise. In crisis situations of this kind a currency 
acts as a natural shock absorber.  
And by the way, this has nothing to do with 
Germany’s high balance of trade surplus within 
the euro-zone. It is not exacerbated by the weak 
euro. In point of fact the external value of the euro 
affects all of the euro countries in the same way. 
A weaker euro also makes French, Spanish and 
Italian products more competitive on an 
international level. I think that in the present 
situation it can sometimes be a real boon, 
although of course a weak currency should never 
be a long-term economic policy goal. 
 
The ECB policy is becoming a problem as far 
as the currencies of Poland and Denmark are 
concerned. Can we simply play down the 
importance of the problems emanating from 
the fight against deflationary tendencies? 
The exchange-rate regimes of the Polish złoty, 
the Danish krone and also of the Swiss franc 
before it was revalued show why the euro 
countries have joined forces. In times of crisis in 
particular monetary union provides security for 
exporters and importers, who are not at the 
mercy of sudden revaluation or devaluation by 
the Central Bank. The controversy surrounding 
the decision of the Swiss Central Bank has 
shown how difficult it is in emotional and political 
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terms to talk about the correct external value of a 
currency. 
With regard to the ECB, it has no other option 
than to combat the risk of deflation. It is its stated 
duty. In fact, as far as I am concerned it waited 
far too long. Japan has been fighting deflation for 
25 years and has still not found a way of dealing 
with it. I hope that this is not what is going to 
happen in the euro-zone, and if I have an 
opportunity to contain the risk of deflation rather 
quickly, even if it means accepting a few side 
effects, then I should make use of it. In the final 
analysis it is simply a question of getting the rate 
of inflation back to the 2 percentage points that 
the ECB has set as its target. As soon as inflation 
begins to pick up, the threat of deflation will no 
longer be an issue. The ECB will then stop buying 
up bonds, and the whole episode will be a thing 
of the past.  
In Germany in particular I would like to see a 
debate about the risks of deflation that is 
conducted with the same intensity as the debate 
on providing relief for crisis-ridden countries. I 
keep reading that the ECB has put together a 
programme of support for southern European 
states. That is not true. And I simply cannot 
understand how people can keep repeating such 
wrong-headed interpretations of the facts.  
 
 
 
Biographical information: 
Prof. Dr. Henrik Enderlein is director of the 
Jacques Delors Institut - Berlin and Associate 
Dean and Professor of Political Economy at the 
Hertie School of Governance.  
The Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin and 
Bertelsmann Stiftung colaborate closely in the 
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The interviewer was: 
Dr. Andrej Stuchlik, a project manager in the 
programme “Europe’s Future.”
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